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AMERICAN FIDUCIARY DUTY IN
AN AGE OF NARCISSISM
CALVIN MASSEY*
The law of fiduciary obligation, originating in equity as a device to control
abuses of confidence,' has traditionally served to protect a congeries of
relationships that possess one or more of the following characteristics: repose
of trust or confidential information in the fiduciary, the presence of potential
conflicting interests or duties between the fiduciary and the object of her trust
(the beneficiary), 2 or the presumptive aroma of undue influence of the
fiduciary upon the beneficiary.3 The unifying thread of these relationships is
the possibility of abuse of the power that is conferred upon the fiduciary. 4 This
unsavory possibility is, unfortunately, unavoidable for it results from two
basic facts common to all fiduciary relationships. Fiduciaries serve as a
substitute for their beneficiaries and hold power conferred upon them by
beneficiaries (or third parties, like settlors of a trust, seeking to empower
fiduciaries for the good of the beneficiaries) in order to discharge their
substitutionary function.5 In order to reap the perceived benefits of substituted
* Of the Hastings College of Law, University of California. I am grateful to the participants at
the 1990 Stanford Lectures of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, at which a
somewhat different version of this paper was delivered, to my colleague Eileen Scallen, who
commented upon an earlier draft, and to Matthew Berger, for his excellent research
assistance.
I See L.S. Scaly, "Fiduciary Relationships" [1962] Cambridge L.J. 69 at 69-72.
2 1 use the term "beneficiary" to describe all persons to whom a fiduciary owes fiduciary
obligations, whether such people be corporate shareholders, partners, principals in an agency
relationship, beneficiaries under a trust, entrustors of confidential information, or occupiers
of some other relationship to the fiduciary. The word is derived from the French legal term
"b~nefice," meaning "a benefit or advantage...given by the law rather than by agreement of the
parties." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. (St. Paul: West, 1979) at 142. Though many
fiduciary-beneficiary relationships result from agreement, the extent of the fiduciary duty
thus imposed is primarily defined by law rather than agreement.
See R. Flannigan, "The Fiduciary Obligation" (1989) 9 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 285 at 286-87.
4 See T. Frankel, "Fiduciary Law" (1983) 71 Calif. L. Rev. 795 at 809-10; E.J. Weinrib, "The
Fiduciary Obligation" (1975) 25 U.T.L.J. I at 4.
5 See Frankel, ibid at 808-809.
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judgment, power must be conferred. But with the power comes the possibility
of self-dealing or neglect. Law's resolution of this dilemma is the fiduciary
obligation: the general requirement that the fiduciary be fair, honest, and,
most important, act always in the best interest of the beneficiary.
Recognition of the problem and creation of the fiduciary concept to control
it represent the faintest outlines of a solution. The first problem is that the
method by which American courts develop the law of fiduciary duty is
through unreflective resort to analogy, aphorism, and metaphor. As Professor
Frankel has put it: "[c]ourts currently examine existing prototypes, such as
agency, trust, or bailment that are defined as fiduciary. Then, courts create
rules for new fiduciary relations by drawing analogies with these prototypes."
6
This approach embodies two assumptions, neither of which has much to
recommend it as a mode of analysis. First, courts rarely tell us what facts make
the analogy compelling. Rather, this case, involving corporate directors is
declared to be just "like" that case, involving trustees. 7 The analytical crux of
the matter - the presence of possible abuse of power necessarily vested in the
putative fiduciary in order to achieve the substitutional goals - is not
addressed directly. An additional unarticulated assumption is that fiduciary
obligation is fundamentally uniform, with only minor tailoring necessary for a
proper fit to new circumstances. Even if we make the unwarranted assumption
that our statement of the fundamental problem which the law of fiduciary
obligation seeks to control will guide the courts to a clear determination of
when fiduciary obligations are properly imposed and to whom such obliga-
tions are owed, we are still left with the considerable burden of charting the
extent of the fiduciary's duty.
While courts seem to assume that a uniform set of obligations follow
inexorably upon the conclusion that Mary is a fiduciary, it turns out that they
act somewhat differently. Mary's obligations vary depending upon the
circumstances of the relationship that triggered the conclusion that Mary was
a fiduciary. 8 At this point the questions became quite specific. If Mary is a
majority shareholder in a closely-held corporation, may she sell her shares to
the corporation without offering a similar opportunity to minority share-
holders? 9 What if Mary, acting in her capacity as the sole director, discharges
6 Ibid. at 804. See also D. DeMott, "Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation"
[1988] Duke L.J. 879, criticizing judicial reliance on metaphorical use of contract ideas to
inform the content of fiduciary obligation.
7 Occasionally, courts will justify this analogous treatment by asserting another analogy: that
directors are akin to agents of their corporate shareholder principals. See, for example,
Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Company, Limitedv. Cuninghame, [1906] 2 Ch.
34 at 42-43.
See Sealy, supra, note I at 72-81.
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975)
answered this query in the negative.
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Anne, a minority shareholder, from her position as the corporation's chief
financial officer? Does the result turn upon whether Anne is incompetent, or
whether Mary is motivated by a desire to deprive Anne of all benefits of her
share ownership?' 0 Given the fact-specific chameleon nature of the extent of
fiduciary obligation, one is left to wonder why the courts seem to think that
analogy to "close cases" is the best mode of locating fiduciaries in the first
instance.
If the only incoherence were methodological, the problem might be
susceptible to fairly easy correction. However, since law reflects (or at least
should reflect) the structure of the society of which it is a part, there exists
another dimension which is infinitely more difficult to solve in law's domain.
American society is intensely narcissistic. " One aspect of that narcissism may
well be the somewhat paradoxical expectation that others should conform to
altruistic behavior in order to protect oneself from injury. The fiduciary
concept is ideally suited to this belief. It is the fiduciary's responsibility to look
out for my welfare, even in the face of my own careless behavior. The trick is to
be always a beneficiary and never a fiduciary. But, alas, a society configured
not on status (as was medieval England) nor on contract (as was 19th century
America) but on omnipresent fiduciary obligation is one where we will,
indeed, be our brother's and sister's keeper.
Having sketched out this thesis, it is time to turn to a brief survey of recent
American law in order to determine whether the future lies in omnipresent
fiduciary obligation. Whether or not it does, it is useful to ask if there is some
careful methodological correction that can be made in order to locate an
appropriate niche for fiduciary obligation, or must we continue with an adhoc
jurisprudence of analogy and metaphor.
DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN FIDUCIARY LAW
Unlike Canada, where the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over fiduciary
issues decided by the appeal courts of the provinces, 2 the United States
10 See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976) (minority
shareholder ordered restored to corporate payroll after having been fired as part of an
attempted "freezeout" of the minority interest). Cf. Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co.,
Inc., 400 A.2d 554 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1979) (discharge of minority shareholder from corporate
employment for "unsatisfactory performance" not oppressive within the meaning of a New
Jersey statute permitting judicial appointment of a corporate custodian as a remedy for
oppression of minority shareholders).
See C. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing
Expectations (New York: Norton, 1979); R.N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart:
Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1985).
12 Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 35, which confers broad jurisdiction upon the
Supreme Court of Canada to hear and decide appeals raising questions of provincial law. See
also P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 171-73.
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Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have a much more limited
jurisdiction. Most fiduciary issues arise in the United States as a matter of
state law, and in accordance with well-settled principles of federal constitution-
al law, are not susceptible to review by the United States Supreme Court if
adequately grounded in state law. 13 Accordingly, developments occur more
disjunctively than in Canada, where Lac Minerals Ltd v. International
Corona Resources Ltd 4 serves as a unifying case on at least some aspects of
the law of fiduciary obligation. The American picture is necessarily more
fractured, consisting of a mosaic of over fifty pieces.
This survey treats selected areas and selected cases; it is not an exhaustive
attempt to capture the entire picture. Rather, my goal is to paint some of the
broader outlines in order to develop an appreciation of the main trends. I will
first consider developments extending and defining the existence of a
fiduciary obligation. I will then consider modifications to the scope of the
fiduciary obligation and, finally, I will touch briefly on certain developments
which, at first glance, do not seem to have very much to do with fiduciary
obligation but which, upon reflection, seem to borrow from some of the legal
and societal assumptions pertaining to the fiduciary relationship.
I. ACQUISITION OF THE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION
It sometimes seems that, like mushrooms after a spring rain in the forest,
new fiduciary duties are sprouting everywhere. It was traditionally thought
that corporate agents owed fiduciary obligations to their shareholder
principals, but it was only within the past fifteen years that it was thought that
shareholders of closely held corporations, whether occupying majority or
minority status, owe a fiduciary duty to each other. 15 Banks may have thought
that their depositors were customers, and that by the deposit, the bank merely
became indebted to the creditor/ depositor, but within the past five years they
have learned that, at least in some circumstances, they occupy a fiduciary
responsibility to their depositors.' 6 As if that were not enough to disturb a
"3 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). The adequate and independent state grounds
doctrine is generally thought to be constitutionally required. It arose in Murdock v. Memphis,
87 U.S. 590 (1874), a case in which the Court concluded only that Congress had not intended
to confer upon the Court jurisdiction of purely state law issues (at 619, 630). In doing so, the
Court expressed doubts whether Congress possessed the constitutional power to do so (at 626,
633). Modern commentators, such as Professor Tribe, contend that Murdock has a
"constitutional resonance" that prevents Congress from conferring on the federal courts the
power unilaterally to decide state law issues. See L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law,
2d ed. (Mineola, New York: Foundation Press, 1988) at 380.
14 [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574.
15 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company of New England, Inc., supra, note 9.
16 Commercial Cotton Company, Inc. v. United California Bank, 209 Cal.Rptr 551 at 554 (4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Cf. Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal.Rptr 735 (lst Dist. Ct. App.
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banker's aplomb, courts in several states have concluded that, in certain
ill-defined "special circumstances" bankers become fiduciaries with respect to
their borrowers. 7 Franchisors, who may think they are merely selling a license
to use a tradename and marketing system, have discovered that, by doing so,
they have also donned the mantle of fiduciary.' 8 Holders of "working
interests" in oil and gas leases have found themselves treated as fiduciaries for
the benefit of passive royalty interest holders in the same leases.19 Even that
fictional beast, the corporation, has been found to owe fiduciary obligations
to its shareholders, duties independent of those owed by its corporeal
managers and directors. 20 Since corporate interests have conventionally been
thought of as synonymous with shareholder interests, this is a remarkable
analytic leap.
A. SHAREHOLDERS AS FIDUCIARIES INTER SE
When Harry Rodd wished to retire from the Rodd Electrotype Company, a
company he had nursed for his working life, the directors, consisting of
himself and his children, decided to acquire a portion of his stock for $800 per
share. After the corporation had done so, Euphemia Donahue, a minority
shareholder, brought suit, contending that her fellow shareholders had
1989), review denied December 7, 1989 (disagreeing with Commercial Cotton that the
depositor relationship could give rise to a fiduciary relationship on the part of the bank). Since
the California Supreme Court refused to review Price, the law on this point in California
remains in conflict.
17 Barrett v. Bank of America, 229 Cal.Rptr 16 at 20-21 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (special
circumstances sufficient to trigger fiduciary obligation when the borrower perceived the
relationship with the bank to be "very close" and relied on the bank's advice); Klein v. First
Edina National Bank, 196 N.W.2d 619 at 623 (Minn. 1972) (special circumstances sufficient
to create fiduciary obligation when the bank knows or has reason to know that the borrower
places trust in the bank and is relying on the bank for advice); Deist v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188
(Mont. 1984) (bank held to owe a fiduciary obligation to a borrower where the borrower
trusted the bank and relied on it for advice); Barnett Bank of West Florida v. Hooper, 498
So.2d 923 (Fla. 1986) (fiduciary obligation to a borrower triggered simply because customer
maintained a nine year "confidential relationship" with the bank). Cf. Price v. Wells Fargo
Bank, supra, note 16 (rejecting in dictum the suggestion that the bank-borrower relationship
might ever be sufficiently special to trigger fiduciary obligations).
18 Arnott v. American Oil Company, 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918
(1980). For a defense of the idea that fiduciary principles should apply in franchising
relationships, see H. Brown, "Franchising - A Fiduciary Relationship" (1971) 49 Tex. L.
Rev. 650.
19 Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180 at 183-84 (Tex. 1984).
20 Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1067
(1988). The case is discussed extensively by DeM ott, supra, note 6. See also Kohler v. Kohler




breached their fiduciary obligations owed to her, by denying her an "equal
opportunity" to sell her stock back to the corporation. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court agreed with her, and announced the rule that, in a
closely held corporation, all stockholders owe fiduciary duties to each other.
Just like partners, shareholders in close corporations owe each other "the duty
of the finest loyalty.... Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior."2 But this most fastidious
conception of fiduciary obligation swiftly declined into the pragmatic, for
only a year later, in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.,22 the same court
concluded that, at least with respect to a shareholder's "equal opportunity" of
employment with the corporation, fiduciary obligation demanded only that
the controlling shareholders demonstrate a "legitimate business purpose."
Thereafter, the burden of proof reverts to the complaining shareholder to
establish "that the same legitimate objective could have been achieved
through an alternative course of action less harmful to the minority's
interest." 2
3
Donahue and Wilkes fall most readily into the paradigm of conflicting
interest cases, although there is an aspect of undue influence, or at least undue
power, given the use of majority shareholding muscle in both cases to deprive
a fellow shareholder of the economic benefits of ownership. That might
explain adoption of a rule that would obligate majority shareholders to act in
the best interests of a relatively dependent minority, as has been held to be the
case even in the context of publicly held corporations, 24 but hardly suffices to
establish the vastly more general proposition that shareholders, whether
occupants of minority or majority status, owe an undifferentiated fiduciary
obligation to each other. The Massachusetts court leaned heavily on the art of
analogy, for it thought that since shareholders in close corporations
"fundamental[ly] resembl[e]" partners they "owe one another substantially
the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to
one another." 25 But, of course, the relationship is not identical, and the
differences between partners and shareholders in a close corporation may be
as important as the similarities. Most obviously, partners have unlimited
liability for the obligations of the venture;26 shareholders, of course, do not.
That fact alone might account for imposition of reciprocal fiduciary duties in
a partnership context, since it implicates strongly the paradigms of undue
21 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company of New England, Inc., supra, note 9 at 516, quoting
Cardozo, J. in Meinhard v. Sahnon, 164 N.E. 545 at 546 (N.Y. 1928).
22 Supra, note 10.
23 Ibid. 663-64.
24 Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Company, 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969).
25 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company of New England, Inc., supra, note 9 at 515.
26 See, for example, Cal. Corp. Code paras 15013, 15015 (West 1977).
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influence (or power) as well as that pertaining to conflicting interest. Its
absence in the corporate context should have spurred the Massachusetts court
to establish its new doctrine on analytical, rather than the vastly weaker
analogical grounds that it chose. That may account for the Massachusetts
decision in Wilkes to retreat from the initial position, though the Wilkes
opinion is devoid of any indication that the court recognized this flaw.
Nevertheless, the Donahue logic has been picked up and cited with approval
or applied by courts in at least ten other states.27 Kansas, by contrast, has
specifically rejected the Donahue approach. 28 Other states which have
considered the issue occupy a middle ground, either endorsing the less
aggressive rule of Wilkes, 29 impliedly accepting either Donahue30 or Wilkes,
31
or concluding that fiduciary obligations attach not simply by virtue of the
relationship of shareholders in close corporations, but are triggered by
specific facts in each instance.
3 2
This last approach has much to commend it, for it enables courts to locate
fiduciary obligations only in those instances where there exist clearly
identifiable opportunities for self-interested behavior which conflicts with
legal duties owed to others, or where the putative fiduciary is entrusted with
discretionary power over valuable rights of the beneficiary. Thus, not all
shareholders ought to be classified as fiduciaries with respect to their fellow
shareholders. Only those shareholders who possess the elements of discretion-
ary and substitutionary power that define the fiduciary obligation ought to be
so labelled.
B. BANKS, DEPOSITORS AND BORROWERS
It is virtually axiomatic in every American jurisdiction that banks and
21 Alaska Plastics Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980); Knaebel v. Heiner, 663 P.2d 551
(Alaska 1983); Tillis v. United Parts, Inc., 395 So.2d 618 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Comolli v. Comolli, 246 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. 1978); Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 1990 111. App. Lexis
709; cf. Illinois Rockford Corporation v. Kulp, 242 N.E.2d 228 (111. 1968); Fought v. Morris,
543 So.2d 167 (Miss. 1989); Russell v. First York Savings Company, 352 N.W.2d 871 (Neb.
1984), overruled on other grounds; Van Pelt v. Greathouse, 364 N.W.2d 14 (Neb. 1985); 68th
Street Apts, Inc. v. Lauricella, 362 A.2d 78 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976); Balvik v.
Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987); Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989);
Solomon v, Atlantis Development, Inc., 516 A.2d 132 (Vt. 1986).
28 Coles v. Taliaferro, 1990 Kan. App. Lexis 43.
29 Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Company, 498 A.2d 642 (Md. 1985) (labeling the Donahue
approach a rule of per se imposition of fiduciary obligation); Delahoussaye v. Newhard, 785
S.W.2d 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
30 Estate of Meller v. AdolfMeller Co., 554 A.2d 648 (R.I. 1989); Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber
Company, 390 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
31 Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1091 (Or. 1977).
32 Schoellkopf v. Pledger, 739 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd and remanded on other
grounds, 762 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1988).
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depositors occupy the relationship of debtor and creditor, not fiduciary and
beneficiary. 33 In the 1985 case of Commercial Cotton Co., Inc. v. United
California Bank,34 one of the California district courts of appeal concluded
that because a "depositor... is totally dependent on the banking institution to
which it entrusts deposited funds and depends on the bank's honesty and
expertise to protect them.. .[t]he relationship of bank to depositor is at least
quasi-fiduciary.... -35 The differences between fiduciary and quasi-fiduciary
status were not revealed, and perhaps not very important to the court, for all
that was needed to uphold the judgment against the bank was a finding that
the bank's relationship with its depositor was sufficiently "special" to warrant
tort recovery for breach of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.3 6 For this purpose, there is evidently no meaningful difference,
since both traditional and fledgling fiduciaries occupy this special relation-
ship.3
7
Once again the court relied on analogy, grounding its conclusion on the
observation (it is hard to call it reasoning) "that banking and insurance have
much in common, both being highly regulated industries performing vital
public services substantially affecting the public welfare." ' 38 No attempt was
made to relate the relationship to some previously recognized paradigm of
fiduciary law. Perhaps it is just as well, for a conclusion that a commercial
bank deposit is a sufficient entrustment to trigger fiduciary obligations would
prove far too much. By this logic, almost any commercial transaction would
trigger fiduciary obligations among the participants. Truly this would be a
world of omnipresent fiduciary obligation.
A year after Commercial Cotton, another California Court of Appeal
simply concluded, with no supporting analysis whatever, that "a similar
relationship of trust and confidence exists between a bank and its loan
customers ..... 39 Having thus found the predicate for a constructive fraud
instruction to the jury, the court reversed for lack of the instruction.
Courts in other jurisdictions have at least attempted to bring analytical
powers to bear upon the issue. The Montana Supreme Court, in Deist v.
33 Morse v. Crocker National Bank, 190 Cal.Rptr 839 at 842 (1 st Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Downey
v. Humphreys, 227 P.2d 484 at 490 (Cal. 2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1951); Vassar v. Smith, 183 So.
705 at 706 (Fla. 1938); Denison State Bank v. Madeira, 640 P.2d 1235 at 1243 (Kan. 1982);
State v. Banking Corporation of Montana, 251 P. 151 at 154 (Mont. 1926). See generally,
Annotation, Existence of Fiduciary Relationship Between Bank and Depositor or Customer
so as to Impose Special Duty of Disclosure upon Bank, 70 A.L.R.3d 1344 at 1347 (1976).
34 Supra, note 16.
35 Ibid. at 554.
36 Ibid.
37 Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, 620 P.2d. 141 at 146 (Cal. 1979).
38 Supra, note 16 at 554.
39 Barrett v. Bank of America, supra, note 17 at 20.
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Wachholz,40 grounded a bank's fiduciary duty to its borrower in years of
conceded reliance by the borrower and her deceased husband upon the
financial advice of a bank official. A similar analytical approach has been
employed by appellate courts in Washington, Arizona, and Colorado. 4 1 In
Missouri and Minnesota, courts have gone even further and concluded that
circumstances that should make the bank aware that a borrower was seeking
its financial advice are sufficient to impose a fiduciary obligation.4 2 Though
these cases attempt to ground the fiduciary obligation in the paradigm of
entrustment, they do not complete the task with much analytical panache.
Apart from the Montana and Arizona cases, little distinction is made between
years of substantial reliance and entrustment to the advisor bank of
confidential information, on the one hand, and more transitory advice,
possibly uncoupled from entrustment of confidential information. Surely,
this is an important, perhaps critical, inquiry. Why is it so frequently left
undone?
An example of such shoddy workmanship is Barnett Bank of West Florida
v. Hooper.43 Richard Hooper was an ordinary depositor of Barnett Bank for
eight years. About a year prior to the litigation, Hooper contemplated
investing in a tax shelter being promoted by Joe Hosner, another Barnett
Bank customer. Hosner introduced Hooper to Edwin Riffel, Barnett Bank's
loan officer in charge of Hosner's account. Riffel told Hooper that Hosner's
proposal was "sound and had passed Internal Revenue Service scrutiny. '44
Hooper then borrowed $50,000 from Barnett Bank, which he invested in
Hosner's tax shelter. Ten months later the bank concluded that Hosner was
kiting checks, and dishonored his checks. At that point, Hooper was
persuaded by Hosner to borrow another $90,000 from Barnett Bank to invest
with Hosner. Hooper did so and Hosner deposited the investment proceeds
with Barnett Bank. Ten days later the bank closed Hosner's account and
admitted that, but for the $90,000 Hooper loan and deposit, it would have
suffered an $87,000 loss.
Plainly Joe Hosner was a scoundrel who duped Richard Hooper. But was
40 Supra, note 17.
41 Tokarz v. Frontier Federal Savings and Loan Association, 656 P.2d 1089 at 1092 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1983); Stewart v. Phoenix National Bank, 64 P.2d 101 at 106 (Ariz. 1937); Dolton v.
Capitol Federal Savings and Loan Association, 642 P.2d 21 at 23 et seq. (Colo. Ct. App.
1981).
42 Klein v. First Edina National Bank, supra, note 17 at 623 (special circumstances sufficient to
create a fiduciary obligation when the bank knows or has reason to know that the borrower
places trust in the bank and is relying on the bank for advice); Piggv. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d
597 at 601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (fiduciary obligation can be created by the bank's awareness
that the customer was seeking the bank's advice).
43 Supra, note 17.
44 Ibid. at 924.
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Barnett Bank Hooper's fiduciary protector? Yes, said the Florida Supreme
Court, because it became "involved in a transaction with a customer with
whom it has established a relationship of trust and confidence, and it is a
transaction from which the bank is likely to benefit at the customer's
expense .... 45 Upon exactly what facts was the conclusion of a "relationship of
trust and confidence" grounded? The court was a bit coy on this point, but
there are only two possibilities: maintaining a checking account for eight years
or a single meeting at which the bank opined that the IRS thought Hosner's
tax shelter complied with the federal income tax code. These facts fit no more
easily into the familiar paradigms of fiduciary obligation than the feet of
Cinderella's stepsisters fit into the glass slipper.
The assertion that Barnett Bank was not Richard Hooper's fiduciary is not
to suggest that the bank's conduct was exemplary, for its actions smack
strongly of the same evil as preferential transfers by an insolvent. Knowing its
customer Hosner to be insolvent, it willingly extended credit to another
customer (Hooper) with the expectation that the loan proceeds would be
promptly invested in Hosner's scheme, thereby enabling the bank to assert its
right of setoff and seize the funds. In essence, it made possible a transfer of
obligations due the bank from Hosner (an insolvent) to Hooper. By the
transaction, Hooper's financial condition deteriorated and the bank's im-
proved.
But imposition of a fiduciary obligation upon the bank is not the only way
to remedy whatever wrongdoing is implicit in this conduct. The bank's desire
to prefer itself at the expense of others might have been curbed by the simple
expedient of denying it the right of setoff against Hosner's account, at least
with respect to funds traceable to the final Hooper loan and investment. While
this remedy would have deprived the bank of an $87,000 setoff, it would have
left it with a valid $90,000 claim against Hooper. Imposition of fiduciary
obligation does more; it deprives the bank of any claim against Hooper and
relieves him of his debt to the bank. But this is appropriate only if Barnett
Bank owed fiduciary obligations to Hooper, and the unadorned fact that the
bank acted in its self-interest should not, by itself, establish the existence of a
fiduciary obligation. Self-interested behavior is legally objectionable when an
independent duty exists to not engage in it. Some factual predicate other than
mere self-preferential behavior is necessary to establish fiduciary obligation.
The problem in Hooper is that the factual predicate for fiduciary obligation
is quite thin. Unlike Deist, Hooper had not entrusted his financial future to the
bank through a lengthy history of reliance on the bank's advice. At most,
Hooper had been induced to make his initial investment in Hosner's scheme
partly by reason of the bank's opinion, but there was not evidence that Hooper
45 Ibid. at 925.
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had sought out the bank's advice in relation to the second loan and
investment. With respect to the final transaction, Hooper was more like a
stranger requesting a loan for the purpose of investing in another bank
customer which, unknown to the borrower but known by the bank, is on the
verge of financial collapse. Imposition of a fiduciary obligation on the bank to
disclose this fact, or to deny credit without disclosure, would produce much
mischief. Disclosure would likely violate the bank's obligation to its existing
(and failing) customer to preserve its financial confidences entrusted by it to
the bank. A duty to deny credit either raises unwarranted inferences about the
borrower's financial condition or, if the bank explains that it is denying credit
only because of the intended purpose of the loan, creates the likelihood of
damaging public speculation about the economic health of its first customer.
Barnett Bank v. Hooper is thus a case study of the problems that can be
created by a swift and lightly considered imposition of fiduciary obligation
without rigorous examination of the factual predicates for its existence. In its
rush to extricate Richard Hooper from his foolishness and to censure Barnett
Bank, the Florida Supreme Court used the mace of fiduciary obligation when
a scalpel would have been more in order.
C. TORTIOUS BREACH OF THE IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL COVE-
NANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
It is not controversial that "[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty
of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.
46
Controversy has erupted, however, over the question of whether breach of the
implied covenant triggers tort liability. California, as usual, has been the
principal venue for this litigation. Initially, California courts permitted tort
recovery with respect to an insurer's breach of the covenant, on the grounds
that insurers were burdened with a heightened public responsibility and that
the relationship between insurer and insured was so "inherently unbalanced"
in favor of the insurer that it was a "special" form of quasi-trust.
47
The "special relationship" of insurers quickly gravitated toward other
parties, including, as I have discussed, banks in relationship to their
customers. But it also was applied to employers with respect to their
employees, thus generating volumes of wrongful dismissal litigation.48 So far,
46 Restatement (Second) Contracts, para. 205 (American Law Institute, 1979). See also S.J.
Burton, "Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith" (1980)
94 Harv. L. Rev. 369.
47 Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, supra, note 37 at 146. The first California
Supreme Court to permit tort recovery for an insurer's breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing was Crisci v. Security Insurance Company of New Haven, Connecticut,
426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
48 The first California case to do so was Cleary v. American A irlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr 722 (Cal.
2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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two other states have followed the California lead, 49 but courts in nine
additional states have explicitly rejected the idea. 50 The general utility of the
idea of a special relationship became sufficiently evident that a California
appeals court sought to identify the factors composing such special relation-
ships. The first was "inherently unequal bargaining position" between the
parties, but also included the plaintiff's "vulnerability." 5' The second predicate
was a motivation, on the part of the plaintiff, to enter the contract to seek
"financial stability and peace of mind."' 52 Next was the presumed fact that
"ordinary contract damages offered no incentive for defendant not to
breach." 53 The last factor was defendant's knowledge of plaintiff's Vulnerable
position.
54
These factors at least illustrate an attempt to analyze the attributes of the
"undue influence" paradigm of fiduciary obligation. Though the court makes
no mention of fiduciary obligation, it is evident that the conceptual logic is one
which relies on aspects of both the entrustment and undue influence
foundations for fiduciary obligation. Analysis might have been sharper had
the court acknowledged that what it was really doing was attempting to define
the components of fiduciary obligation in a new context, but at least this
approach is a cut above analogy and metaphor.
The factors employed also resonate with the approach taken by Sopinka
and McIntyre JJ. in Lac Minerals v. International Corona Resources.55
49 K Mart Corporation v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987); Dare v. Montana Petroleum
Marketing Co., 687 P.2d 1015 (Mont. 1984). In Carter v. Catamore Company, Inc., 571
F.Supp. 94 (N.D. I1. 1983), a federal district court construed Rhode Island law to permit tort
recovery for breach of the implied covenant in an employment context. No Rhode Island
court has concurred.
50 Cases finding no tort recovery for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing include Arco Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150 at 1153-54 (Alaska 1988);
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 710 P.2d 1025 at 1040-41 (Ariz. 1985); Martin
v. Federal Life Insurance Company, 440 N.E.2d 998 at 1006 (111. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
Cases finding that employment agreements do not contain such an implied covenant include
Morriss v. Coleman Company, Inc., 738 P.2d 841 at 849-51 (Kan. 1987) (at-will contract);
Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Association of Grand Forks, 407 N.W.2d 206 at 210-15
(N.D. 1987) (at will contract); Hunt v. IBM Mid America Employees Federal Credit Union,
384 N.W.2d 853 at 858 (Minn. 1986) (no implied covenant read into any employment
agreement); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Company, 685 P.2d 1081 at 1086 (Wash. 1984) (no
implied covenant read into any employment agreement). A third group has effectively barred
tort recovery by limiting recoverable damages to benefits earned under the contract. See Cook
v. Alexander, 488 A.2d 1295 at 1297 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1985), citing Magnan v. Anaconda
Industries, Inc., 479 A.2d 781 (Conn. 1984); Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 438
N.E.2d 351 at 356 (Mass. 1982).




55 Supra, note 14.
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Sopinka J. declared that the presence of "dependency or vulnerability" was
"indispensable to the existence of the [fiduciary] relationship" 56 and then
quoted Wilson's J.'s definition of vulnerability, formulated in Frame v.
Smith: 57 "vulnerability arises from the inability of the beneficiary (despite his
or her best efforts) to prevent the injurious exercise of the power or discretion
combined with the grave inadequacy or absence of other legal or practical
remedies to redress the wrongful exercise of the discretion or power."
'58
Encompassed in these views are the essential elements of the Wallis court's test
for locating the "special relationships" which trigger tort liability for breach of
the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The similarity
of approach provides additional certainty that "special relationships" are
merely fiduciary obligations under a different nomenclature.
The rapid expansion in California of tort claims predicated upon breach of
the implied covenant of good faith came to an abrupt halt in Foley v.
Interactive Data Corporation,59 when the California Supreme Court con-
cluded that tort recovery was not permissible for its breach in an employment
context. But the court failed to address the fundamental underlying issue of
when the fiduciary obligation of "special relationship" attaches. Thus, in a
post-Foley case involving a tort claim by a borrower against a bank for breach
of the implied covenant, the California Court of Appeal simply concluded,
with no analytical struggle whatever, that the Foley "decision surely precludes
the sort of loose extension of tort recovery, based on 'quasi-fiduciary'
relationship, sanctioned in Commercial Cotton.... "60
Thus, the California tidal wave of wrongful dismissal litigation, based
primarily on predicate findings of a fiduciary relationship, has crested, but in
all the tumult there has been precious little critical examination of the
predicate. Indeed, there has been almost no forthright recognition that the
predicate "special relationship" is, in fact, a fiduciary relationship dressed up
in a new linguistic disguise. It is too bad, for the law of fiduciary obligation
should be made directly rather than by circumlocution.
D. CORPORATIONS AS FIDUCIARIES TO THEIR SHAREHOLDERS
6'
A few courts have stated that a corporation itself, apart from its managers
56 Ibid. at 599.
57 [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99.
58 Ibid. at 137, quoted in Lac Minerals Ltd v. International Corona Resources Ltd, supra, note
14 at 606.
59 765 P.2d 373 at 389-402 (Cal. 1988).
60 Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, supra, note 16 at 741.
61 This section relies heavily upon Professor Deborah DeMott's critique of this proposition. See
DeMott, supra, note 6 at 916-23.
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and directors, owes fiduciary duties to its shareholders. 62 Such a suggestion
indicates a fundamentally shallow approach to the concept of fiduciary
obligation. The justification for imposition of a fiduciary obligation is to
prevent or remedy self-interested abuses of power. This, in turn, presupposes
that fiduciaries are capable of an interest directly in conflict with that of the
beneficiary. But this is not true of corporations because the corporate interest
is usually conceived as identical to that of its shareholders, at least when those
shareholders are viewed as a collective entity.63 Even if we broaden, for a
moment, the corporate stakeholding interests owed fiduciary obligations to
include bondholders, all we have done is redefine the corporation's interest
that much more broadly. An even larger problem is the fact that corporations
act only through the medium of real people, its agents. But the standard
notion of fiduciary obligation is that a fiduciary holds non-delegable
discretion.64 Thus, the notion of a corporate fiduciary obligation is one which
requires delegation of the fiduciary's non-delegable discretion.
The idea of corporate fiduciary obligation is also in conflict with existing,
elementary corporate law. While directors are ultimately responsible for the
corporation's affairs65 they are not liable for good faith errors of business
judgment. 66 Moreover, at least twenty state corporations statutes expressly
permit directors to take into account, in performing their fiduciary obliga-
tions, the interests of such groups as employees, suppliers, customers,
creditors and the local community. 67 The idea of a corporate fiduciary duty is
62 See note 20, supra.
63 See R. Clark, Corporate Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1986) at 17-19. But see
the text accompanying notes 70-74, infra, discussing theories which would extend the
fiduciary obligation owed to shareholders to include other groups, principally bondholders.
However, even the advocates of this position speak not of creating corporate fiduciary duties,
but of extending the directorial fiduciary duty to encompass constituencies, or corporate
"stakeholders," other than shareholders. See M.W. McDaniel, "Bondholders and Stockhold-
ers" (1988) 13 J. Corp. L. 205 at 303-305; A.H. Barkey, "The Financial Articulation of a
Fiduciary Duty to Bondholders with Fiduciary Duties to Stockholders of the Corporation"
(1986) 20 Creighton L. Rev. 47 at 68-69.
6 See P. D. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1977) at 20.
65 See, for example, Cal. Corp. Code para. 300(a) (West Supp. 1990); Revised Model Business
Corp. Act s. 8.01(b).
66 Clark, supra, note 63, at 123-40.
67 See Conn. Stock Corp. Act, s.33-313(e); Fla. Gen. Corp. Act, s.607.111(9); Ga. Bus. Corp.
Code, s. 14-2-202(b)(5); Idaho Code, ss30-1602, 30-1702; II1. Bus. Corp. Act, s.8.85; Ind. Gen.
Corp. Act, s.23-1-35-1 (d); Ky. 1988 Bus. Corp. Act, s.271 B. 12-210(4); La. Bus. Corp. Law,
s.12:92G; Me. Bus. Corp. Act, s.716; Mass. Bus. Corp. Law, s.65; Minn. Bus. Corp. Act,
s.302A.25 1; Mo. Gen. & Bus. Corp. Law, s.351.347; Neb. Bus. Corp. Act, s.21-2035; N.J. Bus.
Corp. Act, s.14A:6-1(2); N.M. Bus. Corp. Act, s.53-11-35(D); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Act, s.717(b);
Ohio Gen. Corp. Law, s.1701.59(E); Ore. Bus. Corp. Act, s.60.357(5); Pa. Bus. Corp. Law,
s.511(b); Pa. 1988 Bus. Corp. Law, s.1621(c); Tenn. Corp. Takeovers Law, s.48-35-202; Wis.
Bus. Corp. Law, s.180.305.
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both in irresolvable conflict with these rules and would require that no
corporate action be taken unless it is in the best interests of all the beneficiaries
of this corporate trust. Does this preempt the usual majoritarian rule for
shareholder action and require instead unanimity? If non-shareholder
constituencies are treated as beneficiaries, how can the inevitable conflict
between shareholders, bondholders, customers, employees, and the local
community ever be mediated? At bottom, this position seems incoherent. It is
yet another example of the thoughtless approach commonly taken to the very
consequential decision of clothing an actor with fiduciary obligation.
II. CHANGES IN THE SCOPE OF FIDUCIARY
OBLIGATION
When the existence of fiduciary obligation is conceded problems emerge
with respect to the proper scope of that fiduciary obligation. Justice
Frankfurter once observed that the label "fiduciary" was the beginning, not
the end, of analysis.68 The conclusion merely "gives direction to further
inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligation does he owe as a
fiduciary?"
69
A. FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS
As the courts have expanded the range of relationships which are labeled
fiduciary, they have also altered the nature of the duty owed by fiduciaries.
Corporate directors have been given great latitude to discount, or even
virtually ignore, the short-term profit maximization goals of their shareholders
in favor of corporate strategies that seek indeterminate longer-term rewards
that benefit a host of corporate stakeholders other than shareholders.7 0 This
trend has become so pronounced that the influential American Law Institute,
in this year's deliberations upon its long-running Corporate Governance
project, voted to retain the statement that corporate "directors may take an
action that has the foreseeable effect of blocking an unsolicited tender offer,
unless the action would materially disfavor the long-term interests of the
shareholders. "71
Thus, directors are free to disfavor their shareholder/beneficiaries'
interest, so long as they do not materially do so. An indication of the degree of
68 Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 318 U.S. 80 at 85-86 (1943).
69 Ibid.
10 See the statutes cited in note 67, supra. See also Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,
Incorporated, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
71 Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (Tentative Draft No.
10) (American Law Institute, 1990) sec. 6.02, at 122-23.
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disfavoritism that may be tolerated can be seen from the Delaware Supreme
Court's recent decision in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,
Incorporated.72 Time and Warner Communications had agreed to a complex
merger, involving Time's issuance of new stock to Warner shareholders.
Before the plan could be completed, Paramount announced to Time
shareholders that it would pay $200 cash for each Time share. Time's directors
reacted by authorizing a friendly tender offer for Warner shares. Paramount
and two groups of Time shareholders then brought suit, seeking to enjoin the
Time tender for Warner. The Delaware Supreme Court denied the injunction
last summer but delayed its opinion until this January. According to the court,
Time's directors were "not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived
corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no
basis to sustain the corporate strategy." 73 From the perspective of a Time
shareholder, the object of the Time director's trust, the decision resulted in the
loss of an opportunity to sell one's shares for $200 cash. Within months of the
Time-Warner merger, Time shares hit a low of $87.50. 1 suppose the Time
shareholder selling at $87.50 can console herself with the knowledge that her
interests had not been materially disfavored. However much solace there may
be in that, there seems little congruence in all of this with the idea that the
fiduciary is obligated to place the beneficiaries' interest above all else.
This approach to directorial duty is part of the larger notion that corporate
interests are not synonymous with shareholder interests, but inclusive of the
interests of other stakeholders as well: consumers, creditors, suppliers,
employees, and municipalities. If that is so, then directors have acquired the
well-nigh impossible task of determining when to prefer the interests of one
beneficiary to that of another. It is perhaps for that reason that current
attempts to establish the existence of a fiduciary duty on the part of corporate
directors toward corporate bondholders have not yet proven successful.7 4 But,
72 Supra, note 70.
73 Ibid. at 1154.
74 See Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F.Supp. 1504
(S.D.N.Y., 1989) (no fiduciary obligation owed to bondholders to refrain from a leveraged
buy out which dramatically reduced the value of the bonds); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300
(Del. 1988) (no fiduciary obligation to holders of convertible debentures). Cf. Anadarko
Petroleum Corporation v. Panhandle Eastern Corporation, 545 A.2d 1171 (Del. 1988)
(parent corporation and its directors owed no fiduciary obligation to prospective stockholders
of a subsidiary not to modify parent-subsidiary contracts after the parent declared its
intention to spin-off the subsidiary but before completion of the spin-off transaction).
Academic commentators urging that corporate directors' fiduciary duties extend to
bondholders include McDaniel, supra, note 63 at 303-305; and Barkey, supra, note 63 at
68-69. These theories were prefigured by Professor Berle's work. See A. Berle, Studies in the
Law of Corporation Finance (Chicago: Callaghan, 1928) at 191-92 (arguing that corporate




as we have seen, such concerns have not prevented quite significant erosion of
the scope of the fiduciary duty owed by directors to shareholders in
connection with major corporate reorganizations.
B. DUTIES OF TRUSTEES
Even the scope of the duties owed by that most prototypical of fiduciaries,
the trustee, has begun to change. Traditionally, trustees have been required
"to make such investments and only such investments as a prudent man would
make of his own property having in view the preservation of the estate and the
amount and regularity of the income to be derived." 75 But in the final draft of
the Third Restatement of the Law of Trusts, approved in May by the
American Law Institute, the rule has been significantly altered. The trustee is
still under a duty "to invest and manage the funds of the trust as a prudent
investor would, in light of the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and
other circumstances of the trust." 76 But now we are told that "[t]his
standard.. .is to be applied to investments not in isolation but in the context of
the trust portfolio and as part of an overall investment strategy, which should
incorporate risk and return objectives reasonably suitable to the trust.177
Moreover, unless "it is prudent not to do so," a trustee is under an obligation
"to diversify the investments of the trust."
7 8
In essence, this is the recognition of modern portfolio theory, and it makes a
great deal of sense to do so. Unlike the troubled contemporary development of
the fiduciary obligations of corporate directors, this is an example of
expansion of the scope of fiduciary obligation in a fashion that responds to the
structural outlines of theoretical fiduciary obligation. There is absolutely no
reason for a beneficiary to suffer the "uncompensated risk" of an undiversified
portfolio. By contrast, there are a great many objections to forcing shareholder
beneficiaries to suffer the "uncompensated risk" of a corporate strategy that
ignores the shareholders' direct and immediate economic interests.
III. CONCLUSION
Are these developments reactions to the cultural pursuit of narcissism, or
75 Restatement (Second) Trusts, para. 227 (American Law Institute, 1959). The rule is generally
ascribed to Harvard College v. Amory,'26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 at 461 (1830) (trustees should
"observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in
regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering
the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested").






are they emblematic of the national mania for self-interest? Perhaps the only
thing that can be safely said is that these developments provide another
glimpse of what Judge Robert Bork has referred to, in his recent book,7 9 as the
"cultural war" which rages in our time. Its manifestation in the otherwise
prosaic garden of fiduciary obligation suggests a struggle between two
competing views of complex social organization. One view is rooted squarely
in the eighteenth century enlightenment tradition of John Locke, a view that
individual liberty and its concomitant, individual responsibility, is paramount.
I submit that the law of fiduciary obligation, as we have understood it, is in the
mainstream of this tradition. The other view is one which sees the world in
collective terms. Groups, rather than individuals, have rights, and obligations
should be assigned in order to further the collective benefit of society. Thus, it
is wholly appropriate to subjugate the individual claims of shareholders to the
greater collective benefit of consumers, workers, suppliers, and communities.
Similarly, it is appropriate to saddle employers, or banks, with fiduciary
obligations in relation to their employees or customers because to do so will
ultimately produce, it is thought, a greater collective benefit than the obverse
legal rule. The ultimate destination of this viewpoint seems to be a world
where we are all simultaneously fiduciaries and beneficiaries.
This may appear to be a world which makes little sense, but since law
reflects social mores we may be observing the beginning of another large
transformation in legal thought. If it is historically accurate to say that status
governed the law pertaining to the pre-mercantile age and that contract was
the legal fuel for the industrial age, 80 perhaps fiduciary obligation will be the
mechanism to govern relationships in the post-industrial era.
The industrial age witnessed an unprecedented volume of production and
exchange of goods and the law of contract evolved in order to facilitate that
process. But the post-industrial society is one in which the principal objects of
exchange are information and personal services. Surely this fact increases the
possibility that exchanges of confidential information, or even the simple
proliferation (without exchange) of vast quantities of information dealing
with the most intimate details of our lives, can be most effectively controlled
by the imposition of fiduciary obligations upon those entrusted with such
information. Moreover, to the extent that fiduciaries can be identified by their
discretionary and substitutionary power over others, the mere possession of
information about others (if important enough to vest the holder with such
power) could trigger fiduciary obligations. Finally, in an economy exchanging
services rather than goods the opportunities for undetected neglect surely
increase. Perhaps imposition of fiduciary duty in the performance of such
79 R. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: The Free
Press, 1989).
80 See generally, H. Maine, Ancient Law, new ed. (London: John Murray, 1930).
Vol. 54
1990 American Fiduciary Duty 119
services is the surest way to police such bargains, though it seems a trifle
absurd to imagine my barber having a fiduciary obligation in the trimming of
my balding pate. Let us not forget that law's quiver has other arrows, like tort,
that may prove more efficacious in controlling mere negligence in the
performance of personal services.
As we grope forward in this new age, it would be prudent to keep a firm
grasp on the predicates of fiduciary obligation, and remember its roots in
equity as a device to remedy breach of trust, lest we entangle ourselves in a net
of obligation which strangles rather than supports us.

